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Combinatorial Auctions without Money
Dimitris Fotakis ∗ Piotr Krysta † Carmine Ventre ‡
Abstract
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging
monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence
of money, very little can be done to enforce truthfulness. However, in certain applications, money is
unavailable, morally unacceptable or might simply be at odds with the objective of the mechanism. For
example, in Combinatorial Auctions (CAs), the paradigmatic problem of the area, we aim at solutions
of maximum social welfare but still charge the society to ensure truthfulness. Additionally, truthfulness
of CAs is poorly understood already in the case in which bidders happen to be interested in only two
different sets of goods.
We focus on the design of incentive-compatible CAs without money in the general setting of k-
minded bidders. We trade monetary transfers with the observation that the mechanism can detect certain
lies of the bidders: i.e., we study truthful CAs with verification and without money. We prove a charac-
terization of truthful mechanisms, which makes an interesting parallel with the well-understood case of
CAs with money for single-minded bidders. We then give a host of upper bounds on the approximation
ratio obtained by either deterministic or randomized truthful mechanisms when the sets and valuations
are private knowledge of the bidders. (Most of these mechanisms run in polynomial time and return
solutions with (nearly) best possible approximation guarantees.) We complement these positive results
with a number of lower bounds (some of which are essentially tight) that hold in the easier case of public
sets. We thus provide an almost complete picture of truthfully approximating CAs in this general setting
with multi-dimensional bidders.
1 Introduction
Algorithmic Mechanism Design has as main scope the realignment of the objective of the designer with the
selfish interests of the agents involved in the computation. Since the Internet, as the principal computing
platform nowadays, is perhaps the main motivation to study problems in which these objectives are different,
one would expect truthful mechanisms to have concrete and widespread practical applications. However,
one of the principal obstacles to this is the assumption that the mechanisms use monetary transfers. On
one hand, money may provoke (unreasonably) large payments [9]; on the other hand, while money might
be reasonable in some applications, such as sponsored search auctions, little justification can be found for
either the presence of a digital currency or the use of money at all. There are contexts in which money is
morally unacceptable (such as, to support certain political decisions) or even illegal (as for example, in organ
donations). Additionally, there are applications in which the objective of the computation collides with the
presence of money.
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Consider Combinatorial Auctions (CAs, for short), the paradigmatic problem in Algorithmic Mechanism
Design. In a combinatorial auction we have a set U of m goods and n bidders. Each bidder i has a private
valuation function vi that maps subsets of goods to nonnegative real numbers (vi(∅) is normalized to be
0). Agents’ valuations are monotone, i.e., for S ⊇ T we have vi(S) ≥ vi(T ). The goal is to find a
partition S1, . . . , Sn of U such that
∑n
i=1 vi(Si) – the social welfare – is maximized. For this problem, we
are in a paradoxical situation: whilst, on one hand, we pursuit the noble goal of maximizing the happiness
of the society (i.e., the bidders), on the other, we consider it acceptable to charge the society itself (and
then “reduce” its total happiness) to ensure truthfulness. CAs without money would avoid this paradox,
automatically guarantee budget-balanceness (property which cannot, in general, be achieved together with
social welfare maximization), and deal with budgeted bidders (a case which is generally hard to handle in
presence of money).
In this paper, we focus on k-minded bidders, i.e., bidders are interested in obtaining one out of a col-
lection of k subsets of U. In this general setting, we want to study the feasibility of designing truthful
CAs without money, returning (ideally, in polynomial time) reasonable approximations of the optimal so-
cial welfare. This is, however, an impossible task in general: it is indeed pretty easy to show that there
is no better than n-approximate mechanisms without money, even in the case of single-item auctions and
truthful-in-expectation mechanisms [8]. We therefore focus on the model of CAs with verification, intro-
duced in [17]. In this model, which is motivated by a number of real-life applications and has also been
considered by economists [6], bidders do not overbid their valuations on the set that they are awarded. The
hope is that money can be traded with the verification assumption so to be able to design “good” (possibly,
polynomial-time) mechanisms, which are truthful without money in a well-motivated – still challenging –
model.
1.1 Our contribution
The model of CAs with verification is perhaps best illustrated by means of the following motivating scenario,
discussed first in [17]. Consider a government (auctioneer) auctioning business licenses for a set U of cities
under its administration. A business company (bidder) wants to get a license for some subset of cities (subset
of U) to sell her product stock to the market. Consider the bidder’s profit for a subset of cities S to be equal
to a unitary publicly known product price (e.g., for some products, such as drugs, the government could
fix a social price) times the number of product items available in the stocks that the company possesses
in the cities comprising S.1 In this scenario, the bidder is strategic on her stock availability. As noted in
literature in Economics [6], a simple inspection on the stock consistency implies that bidders cannot overbid
their profits: the concealment of existing product items in stock is costless but disclosure of unavailable
ones is prohibitively costly. The assumption is verification a posteriori2 : the inspection is carried on for
the solutions actually implemented and then each bidder cannot overstate her valuation for the set she gets
allocated, if any. It is important to notice that bidders can misreport sets and valuations for unassigned sets
in an unrestricted way. A formal definition of the model of CAs with verification and without money can be
found in Section 2.
In this model, we firstly give a complete characterization of algorithms that are incentive-compatible
1Note that bidders will sell products already in stock (i.e., no production costs are involved as they have been sustained before
the auction is run). This is conceivable when a government runs an auction for urgent needs (e.g., salt provision for icy roads or
vaccines for pandemic diseases).
2A stronger model of verification would require bidders to be unable to overbid at all and not just on the awarded set. However,
there appears to be weaker motivations for this model: the investment required on inspections would be considerable and rather
unrealistic.
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in both the cases in which the collections of k sets, each bidder is interested in, are public (also referred
to, as known bidders) and private (also known as, unknown bidders); valuations are always assumed to be
private. We prove that truthfulness is characterized in this context in terms of k-monotone algorithms: in
the case of known bidders, if a bidder is awarded a set S and augments her declaration for S then a k-
monotone algorithm must, in this new instance, grant her a set in her collection which is not worse than
S (i.e., a set with a valuation not smaller than her valuation for S). (This generalizes neatly to the case of
unknown bidders.) There are two important facts we wish to emphasize about our characterizations. First,
their significance stems from the fact that the corresponding problem of characterizing truthfulness for CAs
with money and k-minded bidders is poorly understood: this is a long-standing open problem already for
k = 2, see, e.g., [25, Chapter 12]. Second, it is pretty easy to see that these notions generalize the properties
of monotonicity shown to characterize truthfulness with money for single-minded bidders in [22, 19] for
known and unknown bidders, respectively. More generally, these properties of monotonicity are also proved
to be sufficient to get truthful mechanisms for so-called generalized single-minded bidders [3]. This is an
interesting development as, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first case in which a truthful mechanism
with money can be “translated” into a truthful mechanism without money. The price to pay is “only” to
perform verification to prevent certain lies of the bidders, while algorithms (and then their approximation
guarantees) remain unchanged. Thus, in light of our results, previously known algorithms presented in,
e.g., [19, 3, 11] assume a double relevance: they are truthful not only when money can be used, but also in
absence of money when verification can be implemented. This equivalence gives also a strong motivation
for our model. Naturally, the picture for the multi-dimensional case of k > 1 is more blurry since, as we
mention above, truthfulness with money is not well understood yet in these cases.
Armed with the characterization of truthfulness, we provide a number of upper and lower bounds on the
approximation guarantee to the optimal social welfare of truthful CAs without money and with verification.
The upper bounds hold for the harder case of unknown bidders. We give an upper bound of O(b b
√
m)
in the case in which each good in U has a supply b. This algorithm is deterministic, runs in polynomial
time and adapts an idea of multiplicative update of good prices by [18]. Following similar ideas, we also
obtain randomized universally truthful mechanisms with approximation ratios of O(d1/b · log(bm)) and
O(m1/(b+1) · log(bm)), where d is the maximum size of sets in the bidders’ collections. Our most significant
deterministic polynomial-time upper bound is obtained, in the case of b = 1, by a simple greedy mechanism
that exploits the characteristics of the model without money. This algorithm returns a min{m,d + 1}-
approximate solution. These upper bounds are complemented by two simple randomized universally truthful
CAs without money: the first achieves a k-approximation in exponential time; the second runs instead in
polynomial-time and has a O(
√
m)-approximation guarantee. We note here that all our polynomial-time
upper bounds are computationally (nearly) best possible even when the algorithm has full knowledge of
the bidders’ data. We also would like to note that all, but the k-approximate, upper bounds given can be
obtained in the setting in which bidders’ declare so-called demand oracles, see, e.g., [25, Chapter 11]. We
complete this study by proving a host of lower bounds on the approximation guarantee of truthful CAs
without money for known bidders, without any computational assumption. (Note that the class of incentive-
compatible algorithms for known bidders is larger than the class for unknown bidders.) We prove the
following lower bounds: 2 for deterministic mechanisms; 5/4 for universally truthful mechanisms; and,
finally, 1.09 for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. This implies that the optimal mechanisms are not
truthful in our model. Additionally, stronger lower bounds are proved for deterministic truthful mechanisms
that use priority algorithms [1]. These algorithms process (and take decisions) one elementary item at the
time, from a list of ordered items. The ordering can also change adaptively after each item is considered.
(Note that our greedy mechanism falls in the category of non-adaptive priority algorithms since it process
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bids as items, which are ordered at the beginning.) We give a lower bound of d for priority algorithms that
process bids as elementary items (thus, essentially matching the upper bound of the greedy algorithm) and
a lower bound of m/2 in the case in which the algorithm processes bidders as items.
Our bounds give a rather surprising picture of the relative power of verification versus money, thus sug-
gesting that the two models are somehow incomparable. For example, we have a O(
√
m)-approximate uni-
versally truthful mechanism, which matches the guarantee of the universally truthful mechanism with money
given by [7]. (However, it is worth mentioning that the latter mechanism does not guarantee the approxima-
tion ratio since there is an error probability of O(logm/
√
m) which cannot be reduced by, e.g., repeating
the auction or otherwise truthfulness would be lost.) On the other hand, because of our lower bounds, we
know that it is not possible to implement the optimal outcome without money; while, if we have exponential
computational time, we can truthfully implement the optimal solution using VCG payments. However, if we
restrict to polynomial-time mechanisms, then we have a deterministic truthful min{m,d+1}-approximation
mechanism without money, based on the aforementioned greedy algorithm; with money, instead, it is not
known how to obtain any polynomial-time deterministic truthful mechanism with an approximation ratio
better than the O(m/
√
logm)-approximation given in [14]. Moreover, [1, Theorem 2] proved a lower
bound of Ω(m) on the approximation ratio of any truthful greedy mechanism with money for instances
with demanded sets of cardinality at most 2. Our greedy mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of 3
for such instances, which implies that this lower bound does not hold in our model without money. Addi-
tionally, we show that the greedy mechanism cannot be made truthful with money, which suggests that the
model without money couples better with greedy selection rules. A general lower bound in terms of m for
CAs without money would shed further light on this debate of power of verification versus power of money.
In this regard, we offer an interesting conjecture in Section 5.2.
1.2 Related work
CAs as an optimization problem (without strategic consideration) is known to be NP-hard to solve optimally
or even to approximate: neither an approximation ratio of m1/2−ǫ, for any constant ǫ > 0, nor of O(d/ log d)
can be obtained in polynomial time [23, 19, 13]. As a consequence, a large body of literature has focused on
the design of polynomial-time truthful CAs that return as good an approximate solution as possible, under
assumptions (i.e., restrictions) on bidders’ valuation domains. For single-minded domains, a host of truthful
CAs have been designed (see, e.g., [19, 22, 3]). A more complete picture of what is known for truthful CAs
under different restrictions of bidders’ domains can be found in Figure 11.2 of [25].
The authors of [17], instead of restricting the domains of the bidders, proposed to restrict the way
bidders lie. We are adopting here their model, adapting it to the case without money. The definition of
CAs with verification is inspired by the literature on mechanisms with verification (see, e.g., [24, 27, 28]
and references therein). Mechanism design problems where players have restrictions on the way of lying
are also considered in theoretical economics. We next discuss some of the work more relevant to this
paper. Green and Laffont [12] define and motivate a model of partial verification wherein bidders can only
report bids from a type-dependent set of allowed messages; they characterize bidding domains for which
the Revelation Principle holds in presence of this notion of restricted bidding. This model has been further
studied by Singh and Wittman [31] and later extended in [4] to allow probabilistic verification of bids outside
the set of allowed messages. The economic model that is closest to ours is the one studied in [6]; therein
verification is supposed to take place for every outcome and not just for the implemented solution and is
therefore stronger and less realistic than ours. Another related line of work tries to establish when a subset of
incentive-compatibility constraints is sufficient to obtain full incentive-compatibility. [21] considers a single
good, single buyer optimal auction design and studies conditions under which no-overbidding constraints
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would also imply the full incentive compatibility of the underlying auction. Other papers studying this kind
of questions are [30, 5]. In particular, the results in [5] (and to some extent in [4]) seem to suggest that one
has to focus only on “one-sided” verification, for otherwise a mechanism is truthful if and only if it satisfies
a subset of incentive-compatibility constraints.
Our work fits in the framework of approximate mechanism design without money, initiated by [29]. The
idea is that for optimization problems where the optimal solution cannot be truthfully implemented without
money, one may resort to the notion of approximation, and seek for the best approximation ratio achievable
by truthful algorithms. Approximate mechanisms without money have been obtained for various problems,
among them, for locating one or two facilities in metric spaces (see e.g., [29, 20]). Due to the apparent
difficulty of truthfully locating three or more facilities with a reasonable approximation guarantee, notions
conceptually similar to our notion of verification have been proposed [26, 10]. [15] considers truthful mech-
anisms without money, for scheduling selfish machines whose execution times can be (strongly) verified.
The authors of [8] consider the design of mechanisms without money for, what they call, the Generalized
Assignment problem: n selfish jobs compete to be processed by m unrelated machines; the only private data
of each job is the set of machines by which it can be actually processed. This problem can be modeled via
maximum weight bipartite matching and the latter can be cast as a special case of CAs with demanded sets
of cardinality 1; then [8, Algorithm 1] can be regarded as a special case of our greedy algorithm.
2 Model and preliminaries
In a combinatorial auction we have a set U of m goods and n agents, a.k.a. bidders. Each k-minded XOR-
bidder i has a private valuation function vi and is interested in obtaining only one set in a private collection
Si of subsets of U, k being the size of Si. The valuation function maps subsets of goods to nonnegative real
numbers (vi(∅) is normalized to be 0). Agents’ valuations are monotone: for S ⊇ T we have vi(S) ≥ vi(T ).
The goal is to find a partition S1, . . . , Sn of U such that
∑n
i=1 vi(Si) –the social welfare– is maximized.
As an example consider U = {1, 2, 3} and the first bidder to be interested in S1 = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}}. The
valuation function of bidder i for S 6∈ Si is
vi(S) =
{
maxS′∈Si:S⊇S′{vi(S′)} if ∃S′ ∈ Si ∧ S ⊇ S′,
0 otherwise. (1)
Accordingly, we say that vi(S) 6= 0 (for S 6∈ Si) is defined by an inclusion-maximal set S′ ∈ Si such that
S′ ⊆ S and vi(S′) = vi(S). If vi(S) = 0 then we say that ∅ defines it. So in the example above v1({1, 2, 3})
is defined by {1, 2}.
Throughout the paper we assume that bidders are interested in sets of cardinality at most d ∈ N, i.e.,
d = max{|S| : ∃ i s.t. S ∈ Si ∧ vi(S) > 0}.
Assume that the sets S ∈ Si and the values vi(S) are private knowledge of the bidders. Then, we want
to design an allocation algorithm (auction) that for a given input of bids from the bidders, outputs a feasible
assignment (i.e., at most one of the requested sets is allocated to each bidder, and allocated sets are pair-
wise disjoint). The auction should guarantee that no bidder has an incentive to misreport her preferences
and maximize the social welfare (i.e., the sum of the valuations of the winning bidders).
More formally, we let Ti be a set of k non-empty subsets of U and let zi be the corresponding valuation
function of agent i, i.e., zi : Ti → R+. We call bi = (zi,Ti) a declaration (or bid) of bidder i. We let
ti = (vi,Si) be the true type of agent i. We also let Di denote the set of all the possible declarations of
agent i and call Di the declaration domain of bidder i. Fix the declarations b−i of all the agents but i. For
any declaration bi = (zi,Ti) in Di, we let Ai(bi,b−i) be the set that an auction A on input b = (bi,b−i)
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allocates to bidder i. If no set is allocated to i then we naturally set Ai(bi,b−i) = ∅. Observe that, according
to (1), vi(∅) = 0. We say that A is a truthful auction without money if the following holds for any i, bi ∈ Di
and b−i:
vi(Ai(ti,b−i)) ≥ vi(Ai(b)). (2)
We also define notions of truthfulness in the case of randomization: we either have universally truthful
CAs, in which case the mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms, or
truthful-in-expectation CAs, where in (2) we use the expected values, over the random coin tosses of the
algorithm, of the valuations. We also say that a mechanism A is an α-approximation for CAs with k-minded
bidders if for all t = (vi,Si)ni=1,
∑n
i=1 vi(Ai(t)) ≥ OPT/α, OPT being the value of a solution with
maximum social welfare for the instance t.
Recall that Ai(ti,b−i) may not belong to the set of demanded sets Si. In particular, there can be
several sets in Si (or none) that are subsets of Ai(ti,b−i). However, as observed above (cf. (1)), the
valuation is defined by a set in Si ∪ {∅} which is an inclusion-maximal subset of set Ai(ti,b−i) that
maximizes the valuation of agent i. We denote such a set as σ(Ai(ti,b−i)|ti), i.e., vi(Ai(ti,b−i)) =
vi(σ(Ai(ti,b−i)|ti)). In our running example above, it can be for some algorithm A and some b−1, that
A1(t1,b−1) = {1, 2, 3} 6∈ S1 whose valuation is defined as observed above by {1, 2}; the set {1, 2} is
denoted as σ(A1(t1,b−1)|t1). (Similarly, we define σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|bi)) ∈ Ti ∪ {∅} w.r.t. Ai(bi,b−i) and
declaration bi.) Following the same reasoning, we let σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|ti) denote the set in Si ∪ {∅} such that
vi(Ai(bi,b−i)) = vi(σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|ti)).
We focus on exact algorithms3 in the sense of [19]. This means that Ai(bi,b−i) ∈ Ti ∪ {∅}. This
implies, by monotonicity of the valuations, that Ai(bi,b−i) = σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|bi) and then the definition of
σ(·|·) yields the following for any ti, bi ∈ Di:
σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|ti) ⊆ Ai(bi,b−i) = σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|bi). (3)
In the verification model each bidder can only declare lower valuations for the set she is awarded. More
formally, bidder i whose type is ti = (vi,Si) can declare a type bi = (zi,Ti) if and only if whenever
σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|bi) 6= ∅:
zi(σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|bi)) ≤ vi(σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|ti)). (4)
In particular, bidder i evaluates the assigned set σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|bi) ∈ Ti as σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|ti) ∈ Si ∪ {∅},
i.e., vi(σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|ti)) = vi(σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|bi)). Thus the set σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|bi) can be used to ver-
ify a posteriori that bidder i has overbid declaring zi(σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|bi)) > vi(σ(Ai(bi,b−i)| bi)) =
vi(σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|ti)). To be more concrete, consider the motivating scenario for CAs with verification
above. The set of cities σi(A(bi,b−i)|bi) for which the government assigns licenses to bidder i when
declaring bi, can be used a posteriori to verify overbidding by simply counting the product items available
in the stock of the cities for which licenses were granted to bidder i.
When (4) is not satisfied then the bidder is caught lying by the verification step. We assume that this
behavior is very undesirable for the bidder (e.g., for simplicity we can assume that in such a case the bidder
loses prestige and the possibility to participate in the future auctions). This way (2) is satisfied directly
when (4) does not hold (as in such a case a lying bidder would have an infinitely bad utility because of the
assumption above). Thus in our model, truthfulness with verification and without money of an auction is
fully captured by (2) holding only for any i, b−i and bi = (zi,Ti) ∈ Di such that (4) is fulfilled. Since our
main focus is on this class of truthful mechanisms with verification and no money, we sometimes avoid to
mention that and simply refer to truthful mechanisms/algorithms.
3An algorithm is exact if, to each bidder, either only one of the declared sets is awarded or none.
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A graph-theoretic approach The technique we will use to derive truthful auctions for multi-minded XOR
bidders is a straightforward variation of the so-called cycle monotonicity technique. Consider an algorithm
A. We will set up a weighted graph for each bidder i depending on A, bidder domain Di and the declaration
b−i of all the bidders but i in which the non-existence of negative-weight edges guarantees the truthfulness
of the algorithm. This is a well known technique. More formally, fix algorithm A, bidder i and declarations
b−i. The declaration graph associated to algorithm A has a vertex for each possible declaration in the
domain Di. We add an arc between a = (z,T ) and b = (w,U) in Di whenever a bidder of type a
can declare to be of type b obeying (4). Following the definition of the verification setting, edge (a, b)
belongs to the graph if and only if z(σ(b|a)) ≥ w(σ(b|b)). 45 The weight of the edge (a, b) is defined
as z(σ(a|a)) − z(σ(b|a)) and thus encodes the loss that a bidder whose type is (z,T ) incurs by declaring
(w,U). The following result (whose proof is straightforward) relates the weight of edges of the declaration
graph to the truthfulness of the algorithm.
Proposition 1 A is a truthful auction with verification without money for CAs with k-minded bidders if and
only if each declaration graph associated to algorithm A does not have negative-weight edges.
In the case of mechanisms without verification, the graph above is complete. Such a graph can be used
to check whether algorithms can be augmented with payments so to ensure truthfulness, both in the scenario
with verification and without. Incentive-compatibility of algorithms is known to coincide with the case in
which each graph has not negative-weight cycles [32]. We will use this fact to show that certain algorithms
cannot be made truthful with money.
Known vs Unknown k-minded bidders In the discussion above, we consider the case in which the col-
lection of k sets, each bidder is interested in, is private knowledge. In this case, we refer to the problem of
designing truthful auctions that maximize the social welfare as CAs with unknown k-minded bidders (or,
simply, unknown bidders). An easier scenario is the setting in which the sets are public knowledge and bid-
ders are only strategic about their valuations. In this case, we instead talk about CAs with known k-minded
bidders (or, simply, known bidders). Our upper bounds hold for the more general case of unknown bidders,
while the lower bounds apply to the larger class of mechanisms truthful for known bidders.
3 Characterization of truthful mechanisms
In this section we characterize the algorithms that are truthful in our setting, in both the scenarios of known
and unknown bidders. Interestingly, the characterizing property is algorithmic only and turns out to be
a generalization of the properties used for the design of truthful CAs with money and no verification for
single-minded bidders.
3.1 Characterization for known bidders
In this case, for each k-minded bidder i we know Si. The following property generalizes monotonicity of
[22] and characterizes truthful auctions without money and with verification.
4To ease our notation we let σ(b|a) be a shorthand for σ(Ai(b,b−i)|a) when the algorithm, the bidder i and declarations b−i
are clear from the context as in this case.
5Strictly speaking for an edge (a, b) in the graph, we should require that z(σ(b|a)) ≥ w(σ(b|b)) only whenever σ(b|b) 6= ∅ as
this set would be needed to verify. However, because of the monotonicity and normalization of valuations, z(σ(b|a)) ≥ w(σ(b|b))
holds also whenever σ(b|b) = ∅, since σ(b|a) = ∅ and z(∅) = w(∅) = 0.
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Definition 1 An algorithm A is k-monotone if the following holds for any i, any b−i, any a ∈ Di: if
Ai(a,b−i) = S then for all b ∈ Di such that b(S) ≥ a(S) it holds b(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ b(S).
Theorem 1 An algorithm A is truthful without money and with verification for known k-minded bidders if
and only if A is k-monotone.
Proof. Fix i, b−i and consider the declaration graph associated to algorithm A. Take any edge of the graph
(b, a) and let S denote Ai(a,b−i). By definition, the edge exists if and only if b(S) ≥ a(S).
Now if the algorithm is k-monotone then we also have that b(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ b(S) and then the weight
b(Ai(b,b−i)) − b(S) of edge (b, a) is non-negative. Vice versa, assume that the weight of (b, a) is non-
negative: this means that whenever b(S) ≥ a(S) then it must be b(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ b(S) and therefore A is
k-monotone. The theorem follows from Proposition 1. 
Similarly to [22], k-monotonicity implies the existence of thresholds (critical values/prices). Towards
this end, it is important to consider the sets in Si in decreasing order of (true) valuations. Accordingly, we
denote Si = {S1i , . . . , Ski }, with vi(Sji ) > vi(Sli) if and only if j < l.
Lemma 1 An algorithm A is k-monotone if and only if for any i, any b−i, any ti there exist k threshold
values Θ1i (b−i), . . . ,Θki (b−i) such that: if bi(Sji ) > Θji (b−i) and bi(Sℓi ) < Θℓi(b−i), for all ℓ < j then
σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|ti) = Sji . Moreover, if bi(Sℓi ) < Θℓi(b−i), for all ℓ ∈ [k] then σ(Ai(bi,b−i)|ti) = ∅.
The lemma above assumes that bidders have k different valuations for each of their minds. This is a rather
nonrestrictive way to model CAs for k-minded bidders. In the more general case in which bidders are
allowed to have ties in their valuations, one can prove that monotonicity implies the existence of thresholds,
while the other direction is not true in general but only under some assumption on Ai(bi,b−i).
3.2 Characterization for unknown bidders
The following property generalizes the property of monotonicity of algorithms defined by [19] and charac-
terizes truthful auctions without money and with verification.
Definition 2 An algorithm A is k-set monotone if the following holds for any i, any b−i and any a =
(z,T ) ∈ Di: if Ai(a,b−i) = T then for all b = (w,U) such that σ(T |b) = U , w(U) ≥ z(T ) we have
Ai(b,b−i) = S with w(S) ≥ w(U).
To see how this notion generalizes [19], it is important to understand what is U . In detail, σ(T |b) = U ,
in the above definition, should be read as to indicate that bidder i going from declaration a to declaration
b, substituted T ∈ T with U ∈ U and U ⊆ T . This is because σ(T |b) denotes the set in the collection
of sets demanded by a bidder of type b which defines the valuation of T . Specifically, U ∈ U is such that
w(U) = w(T ). (Note that if T belonged to U then U would be T itself.)
Theorem 2 An algorithm A is truthful without money and with verification for k-minded bidders if and only
if A is k-set monotone.
Proof. Fix i, b−i and consider the declaration graph associated to algorithm A. Take any edge of the
graph (b = (w,U), a = (z,T )) and let T denote Ai(a,b−i). By definition, the edge exists if and only if
w(U) ≥ z(T ), with U = σ(T |b).
8
Now if the algorithm is k-set monotone then we also have that w(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ w(U) and then the
weight w(Ai(b,b−i))−w(U) of edge (b, a) is non-negative. Vice versa, assume that the weight of (b, a) is
non-negative: this means that whenever w(U) ≥ z(T ) then it must be w(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ w(U) and therefore
A is k-set monotone. The theorem follows from Proposition 1. 
Observe, that our characterization of Theorem 2 for unknown single-minded bidders implies the exis-
tence of a threshold for any set. Namely, let A be a given 1-set monotone algorithm, and let i be a fixed
bidder with declaration (z,T ) ∈ Di. Then for the set T ∈ T (here, |T | = 1), algorithm A is monotone with
respect to z(T ) and thus there exists a critical threshold. It is not hard to see that thresholds exist also for
unknown k-minded bidders, with k > 1.
The result in Theorem 2 also relates to the characterization of truthful CAs with money and no veri-
fication (see, e.g., Proposition 9.27 in [25]). While the two characterizations look pretty similar, there is
an important difference: in the setting with money and no verification, each bidder optimizes her valuation
minus the critical price over all her demanded sets; in the setting without money and with verification, each
bidder optimizes only her valuation over all her demanded sets among those that are bounded from below
by the threshold.
3.3 Implications of our characterizations
We discuss here two conceptually relevant consequences of our results above. In a nutshell, a reasonably
large class of truthful mechanisms with money can be turned into truthful mechanisms without money, by
using the verification paradigm.
3.3.1 Single-minded versus multi-minded bidders
Observe that our characterization of truthful mechanisms without money for CAs with 1-minded bidders
with known and unknown bidders is exactly the same as the characterization of truthful mechanisms with
money in this setting, see, e.g., pages 274–275 in [25]. This means that the two classes of truthful mecha-
nisms in fact coincide. More formally, we have:
Proposition 2 Any (deterministic) truthful α-approximation mechanism with money for single-minded CAs
can be turned into a (deterministic) truthful α-approximation mechanism without money with verification
for the same problem, and vice versa. This holds for single-minded CAs with either known or unknown
bidders.
3.3.2 Beyond CAs
It is known that a slight generalization of monotonicity of [19] is a sufficient property to obtain truthful
mechanisms with money also for problems involving generalized single-minded bidders [3]. Intuitively,
generalized single-minded bidders have k private numbers associated to their type: their valuation for a
solution is equal to the first of these values or minus infinity, depending on whether the solution asks the
agent to “over-perform” on one of the other k − 1 parameters, see [3] for details. By Theorem 2, all the
truthful mechanisms with money designed for this quite general type of bidders can be turned into truthful
mechanisms without money, when the verification paradigm is justifiable. As a direct corollary of our
characterization, we then have a host of truthful mechanisms without money and with verification for the
(multi-objective optimization) problems studied in [3, 11].
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4 Upper bounds for unknown bidders
In this section we present our upper bounds for CAs with unknown k-minded bidders.
4.1 CAs with arbitrary supply of goods
In this section, we consider the more general case in which elements in U are available in b copies each.
Note that the characterizations above hold also in this multi-unit case. We present three polynomial-time
algorithms, which are truthful for CAs with unknown bidders: the first is deterministic, the remaining are
randomized and give rise to universally truthful CAs.
4.1.1 Deterministic truthful CAs
We adapt here the overselling multiplicative price update algorithm and its analysis from [18] to our setting
without money. The algorithm considers bidders in an arbitrary given order. We assume that the algorithm
is given a parameter µ ≥ 1 such that µ/2 ≤ vmax < µ. We will assume that such µ is known to the
mechanism, and afterwards we will modify our mechanism and show how to truthfully guess vmax.
Algorithm 1 processes the bidders in an arbitrary given order, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The algorithm starts with
some relatively small, uniform price p0 = µ4bm of each item. When considering bidder i, the algorithm uses
the current prices as defining thresholds and allocates to bidder i a set Si in her demand set Si that has the
maximum valuation vi(Si) among all her sets with valuations above the thresholds. Then the prices of the
elements in the set Si are increased by a factor r and the next bidder is considered.
Let ℓie be the number of copies of good e ∈ U allocated to all bidders preceding bidder i and ℓ∗e = ℓn+1e
denote the total allocation of good e to all bidders. Let, moreover, p∗e = p0 · rℓ
∗
e be good e’s price at the end
of the algorithm.
We claim now that if p0 and r are chosen so that p0rb = µ, then the allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) output
by Algorithm 1 is feasible, that is, it assigns at most b copies of each good to the bidders. The argument is
as follows. Consider any good e ∈ U. Notice that when the b-th copy of good e is sold to any bidder then its
price is updated to p0rb = µ > vmax. Thus, good e alone has a price which is above the maximum valuation
of any bidder, and so no further copy will be sold.
Next we prove two lower bounds on the social welfare v(S) =
∑n
i=1 vi(Si) of the sets S1, . . . , Sn
chosen by Algorithm 1. Let OPT denote the optimal social welfare, and recall that p∗e denotes the final
price of good e ∈ U.
Lemma 2 It holds v(S) ≥ 1r−1
(∑
e∈U p
∗
e −mp0
)
and v(S) ≥ OPT− b∑e∈U p∗e.
Combining the above bounds yields the following result for the algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Multiplicative price update algorithm
1 For each good e ∈ U do p1e := p0.
2 For each bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
3 Set Si := argmax {vi(S) : S ∈ Si such that vi(S) ≥
∑
e∈S p
i
e}.
4 Update for each good e ∈ Si: pi+1e := pie · r.
5 Return S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn).
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Algorithm 2: Modified multiplicative price update algorithm
1 For each bidder i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let vimax be the valuation of i’s most valuable set.
2 Let j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the bidder with highest value vjmax (smallest index in case of ties).
3 Let p0 = µ4bm , where µ = (1 + ǫ)v
j
max, for a fixed 0 < ǫ≪ 1.
4 For each good e ∈ U do pje := p0.
5 Let for any i = j, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , n, next(i) be the next number in this order, e.g.,
next(j) = 1, next(1) = 2, . . . , next(j − 1) = j + 1, . . . , next(n − 1) = n, next(n) = n+ 1.
6 For each bidder i = j, 1, 2, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , n do
7 Set Si := argmax {vi(S) : S ∈ Si such that vi(S) ≥
∑
e∈S p
i
e}.
8 Update for each good e ∈ Si: pnext(i)e := pie · r.
9 Return S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sj−1, Sj , Sj+1, . . . , Sn).
Theorem 3 Algorithm 1 with p0 = µ4bm and r = (4bm)
1/b produces a feasible allocation S such that
v(S) ≥ OPT2(b(r−1)+1) ≥ OPTO(b·(m)1/b) .
Proof. Feasibility follows from the fact that p0rb = µ. The first bound of Lemma 2 gives b(r − 1)v(S) ≥
b
∑
e∈U p
∗
e − bmp0, which by the second bound is b(r − 1)v(S) ≥ b
∑
e∈U p
∗
e − bmp0 ≥ OPT − v(S) −
bmp0 ≥ OPT/2 − v(S), where the last inequality follows by vmax ≤ OPT. This finally gives us v(S) ≥
OPT
2(b(r−1)+1) . 
Theorem 4 Algorithm 1 is a truthful mechanism without money and with verification for CAs with unknown
k-minded bidders.
Proof. Fix i and b−i. As in Definition 2, take two declarations of bidder i, a = (z,T ) and b = (w,U) with
w(U) ≥ z(T ), where T = Ai(a,b−i) and U = σ(T |b). (In this proof, A denotes Algorithm 1.) Recall that
U ⊆ T and U ∈ U .
Note that the ordering is independent of the bids and then when i is considered the prices pie for the
elements e of U are the same in both A(a,b−i) and A(b,b−i). Since T = Ai(a,b−i), we note that z(T ) ≥∑
e∈T p
i
e. This yields, w(U) ≥ z(T ) ≥
∑
e∈T p
i
e ≥
∑
e∈U p
i
e. This implies that when A(b,b−i) executes
line 3, the set U is taken into consideration and we can therefore conclude that w(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ w(U). This
shows that A is k-set monotone and then, by Theorem 2, our claim. 
We now modify Algorithm 1 in order to remove the assumption on the knowledge of µ. The modified
algorithm is presented as Algorithm 2. We have the following result.
Theorem 5 Algorithm 2 is a truthful mechanism without money and with verification for CAs with unknown
k-minded bidders. Its approximation ratio is O(b · (m)1/b).
Proof. Approximation ratio and feasibility of the produced solution follow from the choice of p0 and from
setting µ = (1 + ǫ)vjmax, for 0 < ǫ ≪ 1. Indeed, we can use the previous analysis of Algorithm 1 that did
not make any assumption on the order in which bidders are processed and only required µ/2 ≤ vmax < µ.
We will argue now about truthfulness of the modified algorithm. Let us call bidder j in Algorithm
2, the max bidder. We first observe that bidder j is allocated the set in her (reported) demand with highest
(reported) valuation. This is because her declaration of vjmax for her best set, sayQ, is larger than
∑
e∈Q p
j
e =
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|Q| · p0 = |Q| · (1+ǫ)v
j
max
4bm since |Q| ≤ m. Now, fix i and b−i. As in Definition 2, take two declarations of
bidder i, a = (z,T ) and b = (w,U) with w(U) ≥ z(T ), where T = Ai(a,b−i) and U = σ(T |b). (In this
proof, A denotes Algorithm 2.) Recall that U ⊆ T and U ∈ U . Let ja (resp., jb) be the max bidder for the
bid vector (a,b−i) (resp., (b,b−i)). We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: i = ja. In this case, z(T ) is larger than all the valuations in b−i. Since w(U) ≥ z(T ) and since
b−i is unchanged then w(U) is also larger than all the valuations in b−i, which yields i = jb. But
then, as observed above, since i is the max bidder in (b,b−i) she will get her best set in U and therefore
w(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ w(U).
Case 2: i = jb. Since i is the max bidder in (b,b−i) then we can argue, as above, that she will get her best
set and so we have w(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ w(U).
Case 3: i 6= ja, jb. Since the other bids are unchanged, in this case, we have ja = jb. This implies that the
ordering in which bidders are considered is the same in both A(a,b−i) and A(b,b−i) which in turns implies
that the prices pie considered by the algorithm in line 7 are the same in both instances. We can then use the
same arguments used in the proof of Theorem 4 to conclude that w(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ w(U).
In all the three cases we have shown that the algorithm is k-set monotone and then the claim follows
from Theorem 2. 
4.1.2 Randomized truthful CAs
We show here how to use Algorithm 2 to obtain randomized universally truthful mechanisms with expected
approximation ratios of O(d1/b log(bm)) and O(m1/(b+1) log(bm)), respectively.
Observe first that if we execute Algorithm 1 with a smaller update factor r = 21/b, then the output
solution allocates at most sb copies of each good to the bidders, where s = log(4bm) [18, Lemma 1]. This
simply follows from the fact that if sb copies of good e ∈ U were sold, then its price is p02log(4bm) =
µ > vmax. But this infeasible solution is an O(1)-approximation to the optimal feasible solution: plugging
r = 21/b in the approximation ratio of 2(b(r− 1)+ 1) in Theorem 3 indeed implies an O(1)-approximation
(see also [18, Theorem 1]). This idea leads to the following randomized algorithm in [18]: use r = 21/b,
explicitly maintain feasibility of the produced solution, and define q = 1/(2ed1/b log(4bm)) (where e ≈
2.718) as the probability of allocating the best set to a bidder. (See Algorithm 3 for a precise description.)
We now introduce the same randomization idea into our Algorithm 2. The resulting algorithm is Algorithm
4, where we assume r = 21/b.
Theorem 6 Algorithm 4 is a universally truthful mechanism without money and with verification for CAs
with unknown k-minded bidders. Its expected approximation ratio is O(d1/b · log(bm)).
Algorithm 3: Multiplicative price update algorithm with oblivious randomized rounding.
1 For each good e ∈ U do p1e := p0, b1e := b.
2 For each bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
3 Let Ui = {e ∈ U | bie > 0}.
4 Set Si := argmax {vi(S) : S ∈ Si such that S ⊆ Ui and vi(S) ≥
∑
e∈S p
i
e}.
5 Update for each good e ∈ Si: pi+1e := pie · r.
6 With probability q set Ri := Si else Ri := ∅.
7 Update for each good e ∈ Ri: bi+1e := bie − 1.
8 Return R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rn).
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Algorithm 4: Modified multiplicative price update algorithm with randomized rounding.
1 For each bidder i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let vimax be the valuation of i’s most valuable set.
2 Let j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the bidder with highest value vjmax (smallest index in case of ties).
3 Let p0 = µ4bm , where µ = (1 + ǫ)v
j
max, for a fixed 0 < ǫ≪ 1.
4 For each good e ∈ U do pje := p0, b1e := b.
5 Let for any i = j, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , n, next(i) be the next number in this order, e.g.,
next(j) = 1, next(1) = 2, . . . , next(j − 1) = j + 1, . . . , next(n − 1) = n, next(n) = n+ 1.
6 For each bidder i = j, 1, 2, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , n do
7 Let Ui = {e ∈ U | bie > 0}.
8 Set Si := argmax {vi(S) : S ∈ Si such that S ⊆ Ui and vi(S) ≥
∑
e∈S p
i
e}.
9 Update for each good e ∈ Si: pnext(i)e := pie · r.
10 If i = j then set Ri := Si else (with probability q set Ri := Si else Ri := ∅).
11 Update for each good e ∈ Ri: bnext(i)e := bie − 1.
12 Return R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rj−1, Rj , Rj+1, . . . , Rn).
Proof. Approximation guarantee and feasibility of the output solution R follows from essentially the same
arguments used in [18]. (For completeness we give this proof in appendix.) We will argue now about
universal truthfulness of Algorithm 4. This algorithm can be viewed as a probability distribution over
deterministic algorithms. Each such algorithm, call it A, is defined by a 0/1-vector a ∈ {0, 1}n−1 and first
selects and serves the max bidder j and then serves the remaining n−1 bidders 1, 2, . . . , j−1, j+1, . . . , n.
When serving bidder i 6= j, algorithm A deterministically allocates set Si to bidder i < j if and only if
ai = 1 and to bidder i > j if and only if ai−1 = 1. Thus, algorithm A is Algorithm 2, with a = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
So, to show that A is (deterministically) truthful we use the same argument of the proof of Theorem 5 and
the additional observation that bidders whose corresponding bit in the vector a is 0 have no incentive to lie,
since they are not served anyway. 
Finally we can also obtain a universally truthful mechanism in case demanded sets have unbounded
sizes.
Theorem 7 There exist a universally truthful mechanism without money and with verification for CAs with
unknown k-minded bidders with an expected approximation ratio of O(m1/(b+1) · log(bm)).
4.2 CAs with single supply
We now go back to the case in which the goods in U are provided with single supply. We present three
incentive-compatible CAs: the first is deterministic, the remaining two are randomized. Among these three
mechanisms, only two run in polynomial time.
4.2.1 Greedy algorithm
We now present a simple greedy algorithm for CAs where the supply b = 1, see Algorithm 5. (Note that for
goods with arbitrary supply b, the greedy algorithm cannot do better than Algorithm 2 because of the lower
bound of
√
m in [16].) Recall that each bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n declares (vi,Si), where Si is a collection of
k sets bidder i demands and vi(S) is the valuation of set S ∈ Si. Observe that sets S1, . . . , Sl are all the sets
demanded by all bidders (with non-zero bids), i.e., {S1, . . . , Sl} = S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn.
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Algorithm 5: The greedy algorithm.
1 Let l denote the number of different bids, l = nk.
2 Let b1, b2, . . . , bl be the non-zero bids and S1, . . . , Sl be the corresponding sets, ordered such that
b1 ≥ . . . ≥ bl. In case of ties between declarations of different bidders consider first the smaller index
bidder.
3 For each j = 1, . . . , l let β(j) ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the bidder bidding bj for the set Sj .
4 P := ∅, B := ∅.
5 For i = 1, . . . , l do
6 If β(i) 6∈ B ∧ Si ∩ S = ∅ for all S in P then (a) P := P ∪ {Si}, (b) B := B ∪ β(i).
7 Return P.
We will use the linear programming duality theory to prove the approximation guarantees of our algo-
rithm. Let us denote the set family S = ∪ni=1Si, where bidder i demands sets Si. For a given set S ∈ Si
we denote by bi(S) the bid of bidder i for that set. Let [n] be the set {1, . . . , n}. The LP relaxation of our
problem is:
max
∑n
i=1
∑
S∈Si
bi(S)xi(S) (5)
s.t.
∑n
i=1
∑
S:S∈Si,e∈S
xi(S) ≤ 1 ∀e ∈ U (6)∑
S∈Si
xi(S) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [n] (7)
xi(S) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]∀S ∈ Si, (8)
The corresponding dual linear program is then the following:
min
∑
e∈U ye +
∑n
i=1 zi (9)
s.t. zi +
∑
e∈S ye ≥ bi(S) ∀i ∈ [n] ∀S ∈ Si (10)
zi, ye ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n] ∀e ∈ U. (11)
In this dual linear program dual variable zi corresponds to the constraint (7).
Theorem 8 Algorithm 5 is a min{m,d+ 1}-approximation algorithm for CAs with k-minded bidders.
Proof. Suppose that Algorithm 5 has terminated and output solution P. Let SATP = ∪S∈PS. Notice that
for each set S ∈ S that was not chosen to the final solution P, there either is an element e ∈ SATP ∩ S
which was the witness of that event during the execution of the algorithm, or there exists a bidder i and set
S′ ∈ P such that S′, S ∈ Si. For each set S ∈ S \ P we keep in SATP one witness for S. In case if there
is more than one witness in SATP ∩ S, we keep in SATP the (arbitrary) witness for S that belongs to the
set among sets {T ∈ P : SATP ∩ S ∩ T 6= ∅} that was considered first by the greedy order. We discard the
remaining elements from SATP .
Let us also denote P(S) = S ∩ SATP if S ∩ SATP 6= ∅ and P(S) = S if S ∩ SATP = ∅.
Observe first that if m = 1, then any feasible solution just has a single set assigned to a single bidder
and thus the algorithm outputs an optimal solution, as required.
We then assume that m ≥ 2. We now define a dual solution during the execution of Algorithm 5.
We need to know the output solution P for the definition of this dual solution, which is needed only for
analysis. In line 4 of Algorithm 5 we initialize these variables: ye := 0 for all e ∈ U and zi := 0 for all
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i ∈ [n]. We add the following in line 6(a) of Algorithm 5: ye := ∆Sie , for all e ∈ P(Si), where ∆Sie =
bβ(i)(Si)
|P(Si)|
, for e ∈ P(Si). Note, that for e ∈ Si \ SATP the value of ye is not updated and remains zero. We
also add the following instruction in line 6(a) of Algorithm 5: zβ(i) := bβ(i)(Si).
It is obvious that the dual solution provide a lower bound on the cost of the output solution:
∑
e∈U
ye ≤
∑
Si∈P
bβ(i)(Si). (12)
We will show now that the scaled solution (d′ · y, z) is feasible for the dual linear program, where
d′ = min{d,m − 1}. We need to show that constraints (10) are fulfilled for all sets S ∈ S . Thus, we have
to prove that, for each set S ∈ S ∩ Si,
zi + d
′
∑
e∈S
ye ≥ bi(S). (13)
Suppose first that S = Sr ∈ S \ P, and let β(r) = i. There are two possible reasons that set S has not
been included in the solution P: (i) Case (a): there must be an element e ∈ SATP such that e ∈ S, or (ii)
Case (b): there is another set S′ ∈ P with S, S′ ∈ Si.
Let us first consider Case (a). In that case adding set S to solution P would violate constraint (6). Let
S′′ = Sj ∈ P be the set in the solution that contains element e and let h = β(j).
Recall that e ∈ S ∩ S′′, thus ∑e′∈S ye′ ≥ ye = ∆S′′e = bh(S′′)|P(S′′)| ≥ bh(S′′)d ≥ bi(S)d , where the last
inequality follows from the greedy selection rule and definition of the witnesses. In the case if |S| = m,
that is, S = U, we obtain that
∑
e′∈S ye′ ≥
∑
e′′∈S′′ ye′′ =
∑
e′′∈S′′ ∆
S′′
e′′ = bh(S
′′) ≥ bi(S), where the last
inequality is by the greedy selection rule. Because m ≥ 2, this proves (13) in Case (a).
We consider now Case (b). Suppose that S = Sr ∈ S \ P and there is another set S′ = Sj ∈ P with
S, S′ ∈ Si. In this case we have i = β(j) = β(r). Observe that when set S′ was chosen by Algorithm 5 the
dual variable zi was updated in line 6(a) as follows: zi = bi(S′). Now, because set S′ was considered by the
algorithm before set S we have zi = bi(S′) ≥ bi(S) by the greedy selection rule, which implies (13) in this
case.
Notice that claim (13) follows immediately from the definition of zi if set S ∈ Si has been chosen by
our algorithm, that is, S ∈ P. This concludes the proof of (13).
Finally, we put all the pieces together. We have shown that the dual solution (d′ · y, z) is feasible for
the dual linear program and so by weak duality
∑n
i=1 zi+ d
′
∑
e∈U ye is an upper bound on the value of the
optimal integral solution to our problem. We have also shown in (12), that ∑e∈U ye ≤ ∑Si∈P bβ(i)(Si).
Therefore, by letting OPT denote the optimal social welfare, we obtain that
OPT ≤
n∑
i=1
zi + d
′
∑
e∈U
ye =
∑
Si∈P
zβ(i) + d
′
∑
e∈U
ye
≤
∑
Si∈P
bβ(i)(Si) + d
′
∑
Si∈P
bβ(i)(Si) = (d
′ + 1)
∑
Si∈P
bβ(i)(Si).

We now prove the truthfulness of Algorithm 5.
Theorem 9 Algorithm 5 is a truthful mechanism without money and with verification for CAs with unknown
k-minded bidders.
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Proof. Fix i and b−i. As in Definition 2, take two declarations of bidder i, a = (z,T ) and b = (w,U) with
w(U) ≥ z(T ), where T = Ai(a,b−i) and U = σ(T |b). (In this proof, A denotes Algorithm 5.) Recall that
U ∈ U and U ⊆ T .
Let Sa (respectively, Sb) be the set comprised of the sets in declarations of b−i processed by A(a,b−i)
(respectively, A(b,b−i)) when z(T ) (respectively, w(U)) is considered. Since A grants T to bidder i in the
instance (a,b−i) then it must be the case that T ∩ S = ∅ for all S ∈ Sa granted by A. Since w(U) ≥ z(T ),
then we have that Sb ⊆ Sa. Thus, since U ⊆ T then we have that U ∩ S = ∅ for all S ∈ Sb granted by the
algorithm. Therefore, the only reason for which U might not be granted to i is that A had already granted
a set in U to i, which implies that w(Ai(b,b−i)) ≥ w(U). Then the algorithm is k-set monotone and the
claim follows from Theorem 2. 
[1, Theorem 2] proved a lower bound of Ω(m) on the approximation ratio of any truthful greedy priority
mechanism with money for instances with demanded sets of cardinality at most 2. Nevertheless, we have
shown that Algorithm 5 is truthful and achieves an approximation ratio of at most 3 for such instances. We
here investigate the reasons behind this sharp contrast.
Proposition 3 There are no payments that augment Algorithm 5 so to make a truthful mechanism for CAs
with k-minded bidders, even in the case of known bidders.
4.2.2 Randomized Exponential-Time Mechanism
We describe the exponential-time mechanism, or RandExp in brief. Let I be an instance of CAs with un-
known k-minded bidders, and let Iℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, be the subinstance of I that consists of the elementary bids
(i, Sℓi , vi(S
ℓ
i )), i ∈ N , where Sℓi denotes the ℓ-th most valuable set demanded by bidder i. Then, RandExp
computes the maximum social welfare OPTℓ for each subinstance Iℓ by breaking ties among optimal solu-
tions in a bid-independent way, and outputs the allocation corresponding to OPTℓ with probability 1/k, for
each ℓ ∈ [k].
Theorem 10 RandExp is a universally truthful mechanism without money and with verification for CAs
with unknown k-minded bidders. It achieves an approximation ratio of k.
4.2.3 Randomized Polynomial-Time Mechanism
We describe the polynomial-time mechanism, or RandPoly in brief. Let I be an instance of CAs with
unknown k-minded bidders, let vmax be the maximum valuation of some bidder, and let Smax a set with
valuation vmax. Moreover, let Is be the subinstance of I that consists of the elementary bids (i, S, vi(S)),
i ∈ N , where for each set S, |S| ≤ √m. Then, RandPoly either only allocates Smax to the corresponding
bidder breaking ties in a bid-independent way with probability 1/2, or with probability 1/2, outputs the
allocation computed by the Algorithm 5 on the subinstance Is. Next, we show the following fact.
Theorem 11 RandPoly is a universally truthful mechanism without money and with verification for CAs
with unknown k-minded bidders. It achieves an approximation ratio of O(√m).
5 Lower bounds for known bidders
We first adapt the proof of [8, Theorem 3.3] and show a lower bound of 2 on the approximation ratio of any
deterministic truthful mechanism. We highlight that this lower bound does not make any assumptions on
the computational power of the mechanism, and holds even for exponential-time mechanisms.
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Theorem 12 There are no deterministic truthful mechanisms with approximation ratio better than 2 for
CAs with known 2-minded bidders. This holds even for simple instances with n = 2 bidders, and m = 2
goods.
We note here, that our Algorithm 5 is a truthful 2-approximate mechanism on instances used in the proof
of Theorem 12. This theorem indicates that our assumption that the bidders do not overbid on their winning
sets is less powerful than the use of payments, when we do not take computational issues into consideration.
Furthermore, it shows that, unlike the case of single-minded bidders, already with double-minded bidders
the class of algorithms that can be implemented with money is a strict superset of the class of 2-monotone
algorithms.
Next, we apply Yao’s principle and show that no randomized mechanism that is universally truthful can
achieve an approximation ratio better than 5/4.
Theorem 13 There are no randomized mechanisms that are universally truthful and have approximation
ratio better than 5/4 for CAs with known 2-minded bidders. This holds even for simple instances with
n = 2 bidders, and m = 2 goods.
Proof. We present a probability distribution over instances of CAs with n = 2 known 2-minded bidders,
and m = 2 goods, for which the best deterministic truthful mechanism has expected approximation ratio
greater than 5/4 − δ, for any δ > 0. We consider two instances I and I ′ where U = {a, b}, the first
bidder is interested in S1 = {{a, b}, {b}}, and the second bidder is interested in S2 = {{a}}. In both, the
valuation of bidder 2 is v2({a}) = 1. The valuation of bidder 1 is v1({a, b}) = 2 and v1({b}) = 0 in I ,
and v′1({a, b}) = 2 and v′1({b}) = 2− δ in I ′. Each instance occurs with probability 1/2, and the expected
maximum social welfare is (5 − δ)/2. Let A, applied to instance I , allocate {a, b} to bidder 1 and ∅ to
bidder 2. Then, by Theorem 1, since A is a deterministic truthful mechanism, when applied to instance I ′,
it must allocate {a, b} to bidder 1 and ∅ to bidder 2. Therefore, the expected social welfare of A is 2, and
its expected approximation ratio is (5 − δ)/4 > 5/4 − δ. If A, applied to instance I , does not allocate
{a, b} to bidder 1, its expected social welfare is at most (4 − δ)/2, and its expected approximation ratio is
(5− δ)/(4 − δ) > 5/4− δ, a contradiction. 
Finally, we show a weaker lower bound of 1.09 on the approximation ratio achievable by the larger class
of randomized mechanisms that are truthful in expectation.
Theorem 14 There are no randomized mechanisms that are truthful in expectation and have approximation
ratio less or equal than 1.09 for CAs with known 2-minded bidders. This holds even for simple instances
with n = 2 bidders, and m = 2 goods.
5.1 Priority Mechanisms
Our lower bounds in this section apply to truthful mechanisms that use algorithms that operate according to
the priority framework introduced in [2].
We now briefly introduce this framework. The input of a priority mechanism is a finite subset I of the
class I of all permissible input items. For CAs, we consider two classes of input items. The first class
consists of elementary bids, i.e., each item is a triple (i, S, vi(S)), where i is the bidder, S is one of i’s
demanded sets, and vi(S) is i’s valuation for S. The second class of input items consists of bidders, i.e.,
each item is a pair (i, vi), where i is the bidder and vi is i’s valuation function. The output of a priority
mechanism consists of a decision for each input item processed. If elementary bids are the input items, the
17
output consists of an accept or reject decision for each bid. If a bid (i, S, vi(S)) is accepted, S is allocated
to i, and the algorithm obtains a welfare of vi(S). If bidders (i, vi) are the input items, the output consists
of a (possibly empty) set S allocated to bidder i, and the algorithm collects a welfare of vi(S).
A (possibly adaptive) priority mechanism A receives as input a finite set of items I ⊆ I , and proceeds
in rounds, processing a single item in each round. While there are unprocessed items in I , A selects a total
order T on I without looking at the set of unprocessed items. It is important that T can be any total order
on I , and that for adaptive priority algorithms, the order may be different in each round. In each round, A
receives the first (according to T ) unprocessed item x ∈ I and makes an irrevocable decision for it (e.g.,
if x is an elementary bid, A accepts or rejects it, if x is a bidder, A decides about the set allocated to her).
Then, x is removed from I .
We first show that any truthful priority mechanism A that processes elementary bids has an approxi-
mation ratio of at least d for CAs with known bidders. The proof of the next result adapts the proof of [1,
Theorem 3].
Theorem 15 Let A be a truthful priority mechanism with verification and no money for CAs with known
k-minded bidders. If A processes elementary bids then the approximation ratio of A is greater than (1−δ)d,
for any δ > 0.
We note that with a minor change in the proof, the lower bound of Theorem 15 applies to the special
case of 2-minded bidders. Thus, taking into account instances with d = m, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 Let A be a truthful priority mechanism with verification and no money for CAs with known 2-
minded bidders. If A processes elementary bids then the approximation ratio of A is greater than (1− δ)m,
for any δ > 0.
We next show that any truthful priority mechanism A that processes bidders has an approximation ratio
of at least m/2 for CAs with known k-minded bidders. We note that such priority mechanism A is potentially
more powerful than a priority mechanism that processes elementary bids, since when A decides about the
set allocated to each bidder i, it has full information about i’s valuation function. The proof of the following
result adapts the proof of [1, Theorem 4] to our setting.
Theorem 16 Let A be a truthful priority mechanism with verification and no money for CAs with known
2-minded bidders. If A processes bidders then the approximation ratio of A is greater than (1− δ)m/2, for
any δ > 0.
5.2 Discussion
A step that seems necessary for an approximation ratio of O(
√
m) for CAs is that the algorithm somehow
compares the social welfare and chooses the best of the following two extreme solutions: a solution that only
consists of the most valuable set demanded by some bidder, and a solution consisting of many small sets
with a large total valuation. Otherwise, the algorithm cannot achieve an approximation ratio of o(m) even
for the simple case where bidder 1 is double-minded for U = {a1, . . . , am} with valuation x ∈ {1 + ε,m2}
and for the good a1 with valuation 1, and each bidder i, 2 ≤ i ≤ m, is single-minded for the good ai with
valuation 1. In fact, this is one of the restrictions of priority algorithms exploited in the proofs of the lower
bounds of Ω(m) above.
On the other hand, comparing the social welfare of these two extreme solutions seems also sufficient for
an O(
√
m)-approximation, in the sense that taking the best of (i) the most valuable set demanded by some
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bidder, and (ii) the solution of Algorithm 5, if we only allocate sets of cardinality at most √m, gives an
O(
√
m)-approximation (see Theorem 11 for the analysis, see also e.g., [3, Section 6] for another example
of an O(
√
m)-approximation algorithm based on a similar comparison).
For CAs without money, it seems virtually impossible to let a deterministic mechanism truthfully imple-
ment a comparison between the social welfare of those extreme solutions. This is because the only way for
a deterministic mechanism to make sure that the bidder with the maximum valuation does not lie about it is
to allocate her most valuable set to her, so that verification applies to this particular bid (see also how Algo-
rithm 2 learns about vmax). But this leads to an approximation ratio of Ω(m). In fact, this seems the main
obstacle towards a deterministic truthful O(
√
m)-approximate mechanism for CAs with k-minded bidders.
So, we conjecture that there is a strong lower bound of Ω(m) on the approximation ratio of deterministic
truthful mechanisms.
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A Postponed proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let us first show that the existence of the thresholds for an algorithm A implies that A is k-monotone.
Fix i, b−i and ti; let a be a declaration in Di such that a(Sji ) > Θ
j
i (b−i) for some j ∈ [k] and a(Sℓi ) <
Θℓi(b−i) for ℓ < j. Then Ai(a,b−i) = S
j
i . Now take b ∈ Di such that b(Sji ) ≥ a(Sji ). No matter what the
declaration b(Shi ) is, for h 6= j, by definition of thresholds we have that Ai(b,b−i) = Sli , l ≤ j.
For the opposite direction, fix i, b−i and ti; let a be a declaration in Di such that Ai(a,b−i) = Sji . We
prove by induction on j that there exists a threshold Θji (b−i) as in the statement. For the base case consider
j = 1. It is straightforward to see that the threshold Θ1i (b−i) exists [19]. Now assume that there are
thresholds Θ1i (b−i), . . . ,Θ
j−1
i (b−i) and take b ∈ Di to be such that b(Sji ) ≥ a(Sji ) and b(Shi ) < Θhi (b−i)
for h < j. By definition of Θ1i (b−i), . . . ,Θ
j−1
i (b−i) and that of k-monotonicity, σ(Ai(b,b−i)|ti) = Sji .
We can then conclude that there exists a threshold Θji (b−i) as well. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We first prove the first bound. Because the algorithm sells only sets above their thresholds, vi(Si) ≥∑
e∈Si
pie. Hence,
v(S) ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈Si
pie =
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈Si
p0r
ℓie = p0
∑
e∈U
ℓ∗e−1∑
k=0
rk = p0
∑
e∈U
rℓ
∗
e − 1
r − 1 ,
which gives the bound.
For the second bound of the lemma, consider an optimal feasible allocation T = (T1, . . . , Tn). The set
choice in line 3 in the algorithm of [18] is done by asking the demand oracle.6 We observe here that the set
choice in this line in Algorithm 1 is sufficient for showing this claim. Namely, if vi(Ti) ≥
∑
e∈Ti
pie, then
by the choice of the algorithm vi(Si) ≥ vi(Ti), and so we have vi(Si) ≥ vi(Ti)−
∑
e∈Ti
pie. If on the other
hand vi(Ti) <
∑
e∈Ti
pie, then vi(Si) ≥ vi(Ti)−
∑
e∈Ti
pie also holds.
Because p∗e ≥ pie, for every i and e, this implies vi(Si) ≥ vi(Ti)−
∑
e∈Ti
p∗e. Summing over all bidders
gives v(S) =
∑n
i=1 vi(Si) ≥
∑n
i=1 vi(Ti)−
∑n
i=1
∑
e∈Ti
p∗e ≥ v(T )−b
∑
e∈U p
∗
e, where the latter equation
uses the fact that T is feasible so that each good is given to at most b sets. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. The produced solution R is feasible, because we ask bidders in line 8 only for sets containing
available goods.
For proving the approximation ratio we observe that the only difference between the randomized round-
ing algorithm from [18] and Algorithm 4 is that our algorithm serves first the max bidder and allocates her
best set with probability 1 rather than with probability q ≤ 1, the remaining bidders are served as in the
former algorithm. We restate Lemma 5 and 4 from [18] here. The first of these lemmas is used to prove the
second and the second implies our approximation guarantee.
6Given goods’ prices, the demand oracle of a given bidder with valuation function vi outputs the set S maximizing the differ-
ence between the set’s valuation vi(S) and the sum of the prices of its goods.
21
Lemma 3 Let us consider CAs with demanded sets of size at most d ≥ 1 and let q−1 = 2ed1/b log(4bm).
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and any set T ⊆ U with |T | ≤ d, we have E [vi(T ∩ Ui)] ≥ 12vi(T ).
Lemma 4 Suppose the probability q−1 = 2ed1/b log(4bm) is used in Algorithm 4. Then E [v(S)] ≥ 18OPT
and E [v(R)] ≥ q8OPT .
The proof of the former lemma in [18] remains unchanged in our case. The only change that is needed
in the proof from [18] of the latter lemma is firstly to observe that the way of handling the max bidder
actually helps the approximation ratio. Secondly, as shown in the proof of the second bound of Lemma 2,
Algorithm 4 chooses in line 8 set Si := argmax {vi(S) : S ∈ Si such that S ⊆ Ui and vi(S) ≥
∑
e∈S p
i
e},
which implies that vi(Si) ≥ vi(Ti)−
∑
e∈Ti
pie, and this is what is needed in the proof.
The universal truthfulness of Algorithm 4 is proved in the main body of the paper. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. We only give a sketch here. We use Algorithm 4 as a subroutine and use a standard randomization on
the top of this algorithm. Namely, the mechanism flips a fair coin to choose one out of two algorithms. If the
coin shows head, then Algorithm 4 is executed with parameter q set analogously to the case of sets of size
at most d = ⌊m bb+1 ⌋, that is, with q−1 = 2ed1/b log(4bm). If the coin shows tail, then the mechanism only
considers sets of full cardinality m. This setting corresponds to an auction where each bidder wants to buy
only a single super item (corresponding to U) which is available in b copies. The b copies of the super item
are sold by calling Algorithm 4 with m = 1 (single item) and d = 1 (sets of cardinality 1). This mechanism
can easily be shown to be universally truthful and a simple analysis shows the claimed approximation ratio,
see, e.g., [18]. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We consider 3 instances I , I ′, I ′′, with known bidders and U = {a, b}. In all of them, bidder 1 is
interested in S1 = {{a}, {b}}, and bidder 2 is interested in S2 = {{a}} and has v2({a}) = 1. Let δ > 0 be
some small constant less than 1/2. In I , bidder 1 has v1({a}) = 1− δ and v1({b}) = 0. In I ′, bidder 1 has
v′1({a}) = 1 + δ and v′1({b}) = 1. In I ′′, bidder 1 has v′′1 ({a}) = 1− δ and v′′1 ({b}) = 1− 2δ. Therefore,
the allocation of Algorithm 5 is {b} to bidder 1 and {a} to bidder 2 for instance I , {a} to bidder 1 and ∅
to bidder 2 for instance I ′, and {b} to bidder 1 and {a} to bidder 2 for instance I ′′. Now we consider the
vertices corresponding to v1, v′1, and v′′1 of the declaration graph for Algorithm 5 and find an edge (v1, v′1) of
weight −(1− δ), an edge (v′1, v′′1 ) of weight δ, and an edge (v′′1 , v1) of weight 0. Therefore, the declaration
graph contains a negative cycle v1 → v′1 → v′′1 → v1, which implies that the valuation-greedy mechanism
cannot be truthfully implemented with money. 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. Since all bidders are single-minded in each subinstance Iℓ, the allocation corresponding to the
maximum social welfare OPTℓ using a fixed tie-breaking rule is, by Theorem 2, truthful, for each ℓ ∈ [k].
Therefore, RandExp is universally truthful. As for the approximation ratio, the expected social welfare of
RandExp is
∑k
ℓ=1OPTℓ/k. Since the maximum social welfare of I is at most
∑k
ℓ=1OPTℓ, RandExp
has an approximation ratio of k. 
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A.7 Proof of Theorem 11
Proof. As for the truthfulness of RandPoly, the deterministic allocation of the set of maximum valuation
with a fixed tie-breaking rule is, by Theorem 2, truthful. Furthermore, the formation of the subinstance Is
and the application of Algorithm 5 to it can be regarded as a run of the algorithm on I where any elementary
bid (i, S, vi(S)) with |S| >
√
m is considered unfeasible and immediately rejected. By using the arguments
used in Theorem 9, we can prove that this
√
m-cardinality-sensitive variant of Algorithm 5 to I is truthful.
Therefore, RandPoly is universally truthful.
As for the approximation ratio, we let OPT denote the optimal social welfare of I , OPTs denote the
optimal social welfare of the subinstance Is, and OPTl denote the optimal social welfare of the subinstance
Il = I \ Is. We observe that OPT ≤ OPTs + OPTl. Since Il contains only elementary bids (i, S, vi(S))
with |S| > √m and vi(S) ≤ vmax, OPTl ≤
√
mvmax. Moreover, by Theorem 8, the allocation computed
by the application of valuation-greedy to Is is a (
√
m + 1)-approximation of OPTs. Hence, the expected
social welfare of RandPoly is at least:
1
2
(
vmax +
OPTs√
m+ 1
)
≥ OPTs +OPTl
2(
√
m+ 1)
Therefore, the approximation ratio of RandPoly is 2(
√
m+ 1). 
A.8 Proof of Theorem 12
Proof. For sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is a deterministic truthful mechanism A with an
approximation ratio of 2−δ, for some δ > 0. We consider two instances where U = {a, b}, and both bidders
are in S1 = S2 = {{a}, {b}}. In the first instance, v1({a}) = 1 + δ and v1({b}) = 1, and v2({a}) = 1 + δ
and v2({b}) = 1. Since A is a (2− δ)-approximation algorithm, A(v1, v2) must allocate both sets {a} and
{b}. Without loss of generality, we assume that A(v1, v2) allocates {a} to bidder 1 and {b} to bidder 2.
Moreover, by Theorem 1, if v′2({a}) = 1 + δ and v′2({b}) = 0, then A(v1, v′2) must allocate {a} to bidder
1 and {b} to bidder 2. Therefore, A has an approximation ratio of at least (2 + δ)/(1 + δ), which is larger
than 2− δ, for all δ > 0. 
A.9 Proof of Theorem 14
Proof. For sake of contradiction, we assume that there is a randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism
A with approximation ratio at most ρ = 1.09.
As in the proofs of Theorems 12 and 13, we consider instances where U = {a, b}, the first bidder is
interested in S1 = {{a, b}, {b}}, and the second bidder is interested in S2 = {{a}}. We consider two
instances I and I ′. In both of them, the valuation of bidder 2 is v2({a}) = 1. The valuation of bidder 1 is
v1({a, b}) = ϕ, where ϕ = (1 +
√
5)/2 is the golden ratio, and v1({b}) = 0 in I , and v′1({a, b}) = ϕ and
v′1({b}) = 1 in I ′.
We assume that A can have only two different solutions for instances I and I ′. More specifically, either
A allocates {a, b} to bidder 1 and ∅ to bidder 2, which happens with probability p for instance I and q for
instance I ′, or A allocates {b} to bidder 1 and {a} to bidder 2, which happens with probability 1 − p for
instance I and 1 − q for instance I ′. Note that this assumption is without loss of generality, since all the
other feasible solutions have worst social welfare than the two considered.
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Using that the approximation ratio of A is at most ρ, we obtain that:
ϕ
pϕ+ 1− p ≤ ρ⇒ p ≥
ϕ− ρ
ρ(ϕ− 1) (14)
2
qϕ+ 2(1 − q) ≤ ρ⇒ 1− q ≥
2− ρϕ
ρ(2− ϕ) (15)
where (14) follows from the approximation ratio of A for instance I , and (15) follows from the approxima-
tion ratio of A for instance I ′.
Moreover, since A is truthful in expectation, the expected welfare of bidder 1 from A’s allocation for
instance I , which is pϕ, does not exceed her expected welfare from A’s allocation for instance I ′, which is
qϕ + (1 − q). Otherwise, bidder 1 could underbid on {b} by declaring v1, and get an expected welfare of
pϕ. Therefore, we obtain that:
pϕ ≤ qϕ+ 1− q ⇒ q ≥ pϕ− 1
ϕ− 1 (16)
Combining (14), (15), and (16), we conclude that ρ satisfies that:
2− ρϕ
ρ(2− ϕ) +
ϕ ϕ−ρρ(ϕ−1) − 1
ϕ− 1 ≤ 1
This is a contradiction, because the inequality above does not hold if ρ ∈ [1, 1.09]. Thus, we conclude that
any randomized mechanism A for CAs that is truthful-in-expectation, has an approximation ratio worse than
1.09. 
A.10 Proof of Theorem 15
Proof. For sake of contradiction, let us assume that for some given d, 2 ≤ d ≤ m, there is a truthful priority
mechanism A for CAs with known k-minded bidders that achieves an approximation ratio of (1 − δ)d, for
some constant δ > 0.
Let L be any subset of U of cardinality d. As an input to A, we consider an instance I1 that for each
bidder i, contains elementary bids (i, L, 1 + δ) and (i, S, 1), for all ∅ 6= S ⊂ L. As a priority mechanism,
A selects a bid from I1 and considers it first. In the following, we distinguish between the case where the
first bid is (i, L, 1 + δ), for some bidder i, and the case where the first bid is (i, S, 1), for some bidder i and
some set S, and show how to arrive at contradiction in both.
Case 1. Let us assume that the first bid is (i, L, 1 + δ), for some bidder i. Then, if A accepts (i, L, 1 + δ), it
obtains a social welfare of 1+ δ, while the optimal social welfare is d, which contradicts the hypothesis that
the approximation ratio of A is (1− δ)d. If A rejects (i, L, 1 + δ), we consider A’s approximation ratio for
an instance I2 ⊆ I1 that includes only the elementary bid (i, L, 1 + δ). Since A cannot distinguish between
I1 and I2, it rejects (i, L, 1 + δ) when considering I2, which leads to an unbounded approximation ratio for
I2.
Case 2. Let us assume that the first bid is (i, S, 1), for some bidder i and some set ∅ 6= S ⊂ L. Then, if A
accepts (i, S, 1), we consider A’s approximation ratio for an instance I3 ⊆ I1 that includes the elementary
bids (i, S, 1) and (i, L, 1 + δ). Since A cannot distinguish between I1 and I3, it again selects bid (i, S, 1)
first and accepts it, when it considers I3. But then consider the instance I ′3 in which i changes (i, S, 1)
into (i, S, 1/d). Since A has an approximation ratio of (1 − δ)d, it must allocate L to bidder i in I ′3. But
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this contradicts the hypothesis that A is truthful since the two bids of bidder i in I3 and I ′3 do not satisfy
k-monotonicity (cf. Definition 1).
If A rejects (i, S, 1), we consider A’s approximation ratio for an instance I4 ⊆ I1 that includes only the
elementary bid (i, S, 1). Since A cannot distinguish between I1 and I4, it rejects (i, S, 1) when considering
I4, which leads to an unbounded approximation ratio for I4. 
A.11 Proof of Theorem 16
Proof. For sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is a truthful priority mechanism A for CAs with
known 2-minded bidders that processes bidders and achieves an approximation ratio of (1 − δ)m/2, for
some constant δ > 0.
We consider a universe U = {a1, . . . , am} and m bidders. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we let gi be
a single-minded valuation where the demanded set is {ai} with valuation 1. More specifically, for each
S ⊆ U, gi(S) = 1, if ai ∈ S, and gi(S) = 0, otherwise. Moreover, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we let fi be a
double-minded valuation where the demanded set is either {ai} with valuation m2 + δ, or U with valuation
m2 + 2δ. More specifically, fi(U) = m2 + 2δ, and for each S ⊂ U, fi(S) = m2 + δ, if ai ∈ S, and
fi(S) = 0, otherwise. In the following, we only consider restricted instances of CAs where every bidder
has a valuation of type either g or f .
We first show that for any bidder i and for all instances where all bidders j 6= i have single-minded
valuations of type g and i has a valuation of type f , A allocates U to i and ∅ to any bidder j 6= i (this claim
is the equivalent of [1, Lemma 5] in our setting). We let fk, for some 1 ≤ k ≤ m, be the valuation of bidder
i. Since the optimal social welfare is at least m2 + 2δ, A allocates either U or a set S ⊇ {ak} to bidder
i. Otherwise, the social welfare of A would be at most m − 1, which contradicts the hypothesis that the
approximation ratio of A is (1− δ)m/2. However, the fact that A is truthful, implies, by Theorem 1, that A
must assign U to i on input g valuations from bidders other than i and fk valuation from i. Indeed, assume
that it is not the case and consider a new instance in which bidder i declares a single-minded valuation where
the demanded set is U with valuation m2 + 2δ. Because of the approximation guarantee of A, on this new
instance, A must grant U to i. The two declarations would then contradict k-monotonicity (cf. Definition
1). Therefore, A allocates U to bidder i and ∅ to any bidder j 6= i.
Using this claim, we can prove the following proposition which is identical to [1, Lemma 6]. The proof
is by induction on i, and is omitted because it is essentially identical to the proof in [1]. In fact, that proof
uses only standard properties of priority algorithms, the assumption that the approximation ratio of A is
(1− δ)m/2, and [1, Lemma 5], which, in our case, is replaced by the claim above.
Proposition 4 Let A be any truthful priority mechanism which for restricted instances with m goods,
achieves an approximation ratio of (1 − δ)m/2, for some constant δ > 0. Then, there exists a labeling
of the bidders and the goods such that the following holds for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m/2 − 1}. Let instance
Ii = {(j, gj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i}. Then, for any restricted instance I ⊇ Ii, A considers all the bidders in Ii before
all other bidders in I , and allocates ∅ to each bidder in Ii.
Using Proposition 4, we can now complete the proof of the lemma. Let I ′ = {(j, gj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m/2−1}
be the instance Ii defined in Proposition 4 for i = m/2 − 1, and let I = I ′ ∪ {(j, gm) : m/2 ≤ j ≤ m}.
We note that the optimal social welfare for I is m/2, and that I is a restricted instance such that I ′ ⊆ I , as
required by Proposition 4. Therefore, mechanism A considers bidders 1, . . . ,m/2 − 1 first and allocates ∅
to each of them. Since bidders m/2, . . . ,m are all single-minded for good am, the social welfare of A for
instance I is at most 1, which contradicts the hypothesis that the approximation ratio of A is (1− δ)m/2. 
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